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ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 75-3-1006 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED BARS THE 
ESTATE'S RIGHT TO COMPEL REPAYMENT OF THE DISTRIBUTION TO 
THE ESTATE. 
Appellee's argue that they may recover an improper distribution under § 75-3-909 and 
that § 75-3-1006 does not limit that recovery. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909 provides: 
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned 
because of adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of 
property improperly distributed or paid, or a claimant who was 
improperly paid, is liable to return the property improperly received 
and its income since distribution if he has the property. If he does not 
have the property, then he is liable to return the value as of the date 
of disposition of the property improperly received and its income and 
gain received by him. 
Appellee argues that recovery of the improperly distributed sales proceeds is not barred by 
adjudication or estoppel which points are argued in the parties' principal briefs. Nevertheless, a 
plain reading of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 in conjunction with § 75-1-201(41) reveals that 
appellees are barred from recovering the sales proceeds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 provides: 
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy proceeding or 
in a proceeding settling the accounts of a personal representative or 
otherwise barred, the claim of any claimant to recover from a 
distributee who is liable to pay the claim, and the right of any heir or 
devisee or of a successor personal representative acting in their behalf, 
to recover property improperly distributed or the value thereof from 
any distributee is barred at the later of: 
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the decedent, one year after 
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the decedent's death; 
and 
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at the 
later of: 
i. three years after the decedent's death; or 
ii. one year after the time of distribution thereof 
In the instant case, the decedent died on January 17, 1983. The sale proceeds of the Ninth 
South property were distributed on or about December 23, 1992. See Exhibits "A" and "B" of 
Appellants principal brief. Appellee did not claim that the distribution of the sale proceeds of the 
Ninth South property was improper until its Response to Jr.'s Motion to Determine Claim Priority 
on March 3, 1995--at least 26 months after the distribution. Accordingly, under § 75-3-
1006(l)(b) of the applicable statute, appellee has been barred from claiming that the distribution 
was improper since December 24, 1993. 
Appellee, however, argues that they are neither a creditor, heir, devisee or successor 
personal representative, therefore, the limitation of § 75-3-1006 does not bar their recovery of 
the distribution of the sales proceeds. Nonetheless, under § 75-1-201(41), Utah Code Ann., a 
successor personal representative "means a personal representative, other than a special 
administrator, who is appointed to succeed a previously appointed personal representative." 
Appellee's own statement of facts in their principal brief indicate that they were appointed as 
personal representative, succeeding two previous personal representatives. See Appellee's brief, 
Statement of Facts, f 3-5. Therefore, appellee fits the statutory definition of a successor personal 
representative and thus, appellee is barred from claiming that the distribution was improper. 
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III. RECOVERY OF THE SALES PROCEEDS FROM THE HEIRS VOIDS THE 9TH 
SOUTH PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTION. 
Should this Court require the distributees of the sale proceeds of the Ninth South property 
to repay appellee for its attorney fees, the sale of the Ninth South property should be rendered 
void or voidable. Judge Noel's December 23, 1992, Order required appellee to accept Morrison's 
offer if appellee had not completed the sale of property by December 21, 1992. See Exhibit "B" 
of Appellant's principal brief. Morrison Jr.'s offer provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he proceeds 
from the sale of the fore said [sic] property will be held in Escrow. Only the costs directly 
attributable to the sale, IE Court Costs, Attorney Fees, Taxes and Closing Costs and a winding 
down of the Estate will be paid from the Escrow account [sic]. The remaining funds will be 
distributed to the Heirs, A.S.A.P. [sic]." See Exhibit "A" of Appellant's principal brief 
Appellees, however, argue that they have complied with the terms of the offer and Judge 
Noel's Order and that there was no condition in Jr.'s offer that the sales proceeds could not be 
recovered to pay the costs of administration or other obligations of the Estate. Nonetheless, Jr.'s 
offer was expressly conditional in that only the costs directly attributable to the sale itself were to 
be paid from the Escrow account. Appellee's attorney fees are not directly attributable to the 
sale, rather they are attributable to the 1988 Action. Accordingly, recovering the sale proceeds 
from the distributees for attorneys fees not directly attributable to the sale would violate the 
primary condition in Jr.'s offer. Thus, should this Court require the distributees of the sale 
proceeds to repay appellee for its attorney fees, the sale of the Ninth South property should be 
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rendered void or voidable and Morrison Jr. would thus be entitled to $200,000.00 in 
improvements that he has made to the Ninth South property.. 
Appellees, next, argue that appellants did not raise this point in the lower court and 
therefore, this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, appellants did 
raise this point during oral argument on the motion, thus, this issue is not being raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
IV. THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY RULED THAT THE SALE TO MORRISON 
JR. CANNOT BE VOIDED AND CANNOT THEREFORE, REQUIRE A 
REPAYMENT OF FUNDS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD 
MANDATE A RECISSION OF THE SALE. 
Since the sale was conditioned upon the heirs irrevocably receiving the distribution which 
appellee is seeking to rescind the sale would have to be rescinded in order to achieve the result 
sought by the appellee. Morrison Jr., on the date of May 3, 1994, filed a motion to rescind the 
sale. R. 1386 The court denied the motion on the date of October 31, 1994, R. 1543. This 
decision is res judicata and the judge cannot now reconsider that issue at this late date. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, premises considered, the Morrison distributees ask that this Court reverse 
Judge Noel's Order dated October 31, 1995, and remand this matter to the probate court for 
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further proceedings consistent with the positions set forth herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3/^av of July, 1996. 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
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